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Although  lobbying  has  long been  an integral  part  of the  policy
process, it remains difficult to inventory and explain the influence of
private  interests  in  setting  agricultural  policy.  There  are  two  rea-
sons.  Lobbyists seldom  choose  to work  in  exclusively  public forums
where  they  leave  a paper  trail.  So comprehensiveness  remains  an
elusive  goal in analyzing  who did what.  Also, many other political,
economic and environmental  factors exist that affect the decisions of
policymakers.  Because  of the potentially  cumulative  effect  of these
factors,  it often  must remain  unclear-even  to those who  are  being
influenced-exactly  who  responded  to whom  or what  in any  causal
fashion.
In spite of these difficulties, it remains important to understand as
much as possible  about the private interests that help shape agricul-
tural policy. Without such understanding,  there can never be a realis-
tic  awareness  as  to  why  programs  and provisions  are  established,
eliminated,  modified  or  left  untouched.  The  Food  Security  Act  of
1985 is  an important  case in point.  Prior  to congressional  delibera-
tions on that farm bill, agricultural  economists were  in near agree-
ment  about  the  need  for  major  reform.  Most  farm  and  food
organizations  also  were  opposed  to extending  the basic  features  of
the  1981  farm  legislation.  Depressed  farm conditions,  huge produc-
tion surpluses and major declines in commodity  exports were attrib-
uted, at least in part, to national agricultural policy.  Many called for
a major restructuring through the omnibus legislation  of 1985.
A great many economists, as well  as other agricultural  specialists,
were disappointed with the eventual outcome of that bill. There are a
few  new  provisions,  some  major  redirections  and  many  reaffirma-
tions of past policy practice.  For both the changes and restatements
there  were private  sector  advocates  who very  openly  played  promi-
nent roles in determining legislative outcomes. These  advocates rep-
resented  a complex  agricultural  lobby,  one  beset  by  contradictions
and conflicts. The final bill was diverse in purpose and fragmented in
structure  because  policymakers  were  presented  with  drastically
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sponding to mixed signals,  Congress tried to please everyone a little
in hopes of at least passing-and, later in 1986, repassing-a bill.
Academics  and Agrarians
The patterns  of influence that were  directed toward  1985  debates
originated many months prior to formal congressional  deliberations.
Since policymakers value factual information about policy needs and
conditions  as means for reducing  the uncertainty  of risky decisions,
it behooves no one  to enter the political  process unprepared.  Lobby-
ists have  little else to trade but their interpretations  of reality.  Be-
cause  of  widespread  perceptions  regarding  agriculture's  critical
status  and  beliefs  about  the  appropriateness  of  dramatic  policy
changes,  those  who  wanted  to become  players in  farm  bill  politics
began to marshal their potential resources early.  For two sets of pri-
vate interests which are not part of the Washington lobby, this meant
that preparatory discussions started in 1983 and produced high lev-
els of activity throughout 1984.
The most detailed  and analytical responses to the pending legisla-
tion came from individuals and institutions that are often overlooked
as private interests. Lumped together,  they can best be  described as
academically oriented agricultural experts. What was unusual about
this loosely knit collection  of professors,  foundation representatives,
governmentally  attached agricultural  analysts and private  consult-
ants was the degree to which they were mobilized in opposition to the
nonmarket orientation of existing farm policy. While there was little
or  no agreement  on the specifics  of reform, there  was a  strong and
important  consensus  on  the need  for  reducing  farm  program  costs
and moving to an internationally competitive U.S. agriculture.  Even
former  champions  of price  support programs  such  as Willard Coch-
rane came forward and questioned their continued usefulness.
In addition to their common conviction that present policy operated
to the severe  detriment  of American agriculture,  other nonagricul-
tural  factors  motivated  the  experts'  policy  involvement.  Economic
and trade conditions,  as well  as the  "Reagan  climate,"  made  it  ap-
pear as if farm policy  was in for a  major overhaul.  As  a result, the
time was politically right for  academics to engage in entrepreneur-
ship; for  consultants to advertise  their talents and services to firms
and associations  who might employ  them; for  foundations  and uni-
versities to demonstrate their policy relevance  as consequential  pub-
lic  forums;  and  for  financially  supportive  agribusiness  and
commerical  firms  to  demonstrate  their  commitment  to  better  in-
formed public policymaking.
For the most part, these players  neither intended to be nor consid-
ered  themselves  part  of a lobbying  effort.  Nonetheless,  the experts
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were participating under the auspices of institutions that felt a need
to secure and continue to occupy credible positions in the policy proc-
ess. The Farm Foundation, for example, has long been considered to
be  one  of  the  facilitating  forces  "behind  farm  policy."  Foremost
among newer activists were the National  Center for Food and Agri-
cultural  Policy of Resources for the Future and the Monsanto  Com-
pany.  While  the emerging  National  Center  sought to  establish  its
reputation  in developing agricultural leaders and  providing reputa-
ble policy analysis, firms such as Monsanto with its Outreach confer-
ences were introducing both themselves and other policy participants
to potentially larger roles in future agricultural policymaking. It was
this  philosophical  consensus  over  policy  directions  combined  with
personal enthusiasm  for influencing  policy  and an institutional  ca-
pacity to visibly  promote their general agreement  that,  despite the
self-identification  of the activists,  gave these participants a common
private  interest and the resulting force and momentum of a lobby.
How  did this  loosely  knit group  lobby  in preparing  for the  1985
Food Security Act? With a few  individual exceptions, this collection
of players  did not work  congressional  offices,  draft  legislative  pro-
posals,  activate constituents  or detail political strategies for passing
related  bills.  Instead,  the  information  needs  of policymaking  were
addressed through well-funded,  nationally organized conferences and
the publication  of relevant  research  and associated proposals.  From
May, 1984, through January,  1985,  such well advertised  conferences
were  held  at the  rate  of nearly  one  per  month.  In between  these
meetings, participants  gathered to discuss policy issues at numerous
other conferences  sponsored  by the  Agricultural  Extension Service,
associations  of agricultural  economists,  and  several  state  govern-
ments. All of this provided the experts with the opportunity to force-
fully  articulate  the  dilemmas  of agriculture  regarding  production
and trade problems, define  policy solutions  in terms  of free  market
values, and, for at least the time being, dominate  the only platform
upon  which  agricultural  and  food  questions  were  being  argued
within policymaking circles.
If academics provided the policy messages of 1984 and early 1985, a
decidedly  different  communique  was  being  prepared  for  Congress
and the public in rural states and districts well beyond Washington's
Beltway.  Agrarian protestors  planned  to deliver  this  message  very
forcefully back home in legislative districts, directly through constit-
uents  who promised  to vote  and with the help  of a  curious  media.
Farm protest groups were active  in 1983 and throughout  1984,  orga-
nizing local residents and preparing their demands for  1985 legisla-
tion.  As  these  activists  saw  things,  the  government  could  worry
about exports and trade problems all it wanted as long as immediate
steps were taken to enhance farm income and reduce problems asso-
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erable conflict in those policy objectives.
The protest activity of 1984 grew out of the grassroots remnants  of
the American  Agriculture Movement  (AAM).  Unlike  1978-79, how-
ever,  the center of protest had shifted north and east from Colorado,
Kansas,  Oklahoma  and  Texas  to  Iowa,  Minnesota,  Missouri,  Ne-
braska  and Wisconsin.  While the organizers  still emphasized  direct
protest  and  sought  extensive  media  coverage  to  enhance  public
awareness,  there was none  of the strong centralized farm leadership
that  had been  present  earlier.  Farmers  were  establishing  smaller,
autonomous,  and  more  state  and  locally  involved,  organizations.
Farm activists  were  being joined  by rural  sympathizers,  especially
from the clergy and the ranks of single-issue  groups concerned with
environmental  quality,  social  conditions  and  world  peace.  Besides
simply seeking legislative solutions to what these activists were suc-
cessfully popularizing as "the farm crisis," organizational efforts also
were directed toward halting foreclosures  and counseling farm fami-
lies about business and personal  problems.  This strategy  broadened
the agrarian protestors'  base  of support  and,  eventually,  won them
considerable  financial assistance from church organizations.  Accord-
ing to  some activists,  the  National  Council  of Churches  and  other
religious  groups  provided  as much  as 70  percent  of the  organizing
funds used in some  Midwest states.
While the academics were hoping that the force of their analytical
work would keep their views in the political mainstream in 1985, the
agrarian protesters upstaged them with old-fashioned  pressure  poli-
tics as farm conditions  worsened throughout the spring. The  conse-
quences were evident by mid-year. As foreclosures and rural business
closings  increased,  several  farm  suicides  attracted  national  atten-
tion.  Pointing to these results,  many farm state legislators  became
committed to policy approaches articulated  by protest organizers. For
example,  Senator Tom  Harkin (D-IA) and other Midwestern  legisla-
tors became  advocates for the Farm Policy Reform Act and, later, the
referendum  for  mandatory  supply  controls  as  it  was  advanced  by
Iowa Farm Unity Coalition, Minnesota Groundswell, Nebraska Farm
Crisis Committee  and Wisconsin  Farm Unity Alliance.  Other farm
state legislators  found  it personally  unpalatable  but politically  im-
possible  to do  anything but insist on high  levels  of direct financial
support  for their  producers.  One  uncomfortable  congressman  com-
plained that, even when he spoke  of supportive  legislation, constitu-
ent reactions and pressures made it "feel like a foreign country back
home."  By the  end  of the  summer  of 1985,  at  least  isolated  farm
protests  had been  staged  in nearly  two-thirds  of the  states and  di-
rectly exposed large numbers of legislators to the farm problem. The
remainder  could not miss it on TV network news.
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Professors and protesters were preparing for the farm  bill long be-
fore many Washington-based farm and food lobbyists had much time
to  make  plans.  Other  legislation  and  administrative  rulings  pre-
empted  most  of the attention  of the  lobbyists.  The American  Farm
Bureau Federation (AFBF) could not  afford to delay its preparation,
however.  AFBF officials  and staff felt their organization  to be trou-
bled by several things. First, the more intensively directed commod-
ity organizations  were being increasingly  viewed as more capable  of
affecting major legislation than Farm Bureau. Second, the farm pro-
test groups were populated by  large numbers of Farm Bureau  mem-
bers.  The  lack of common  goals  between  the protestors  and AFBF
created membership  difficulties for AFBF.  Third, most probably  as a
result of the above problems,  there had been increasing  conflicts be-
tween the state farm bureaus as well as between the states and the
national organization. The Alabama Farm Bureau operated indepen-
dently, and a few other states often  lobbied for their own policy pref-
erences.  None  of this enhanced  the  image  or  the  influence  of the
nation's largest farm organization.
In a rather bold attempt to restore member loyalty and regain some
measure  of policy leadership,  some Farm  Bureau  leaders held a  se-
ries of meetings with several commodity  organizations that insisted
on supporting  high levels  of price  supports.  The  intent  was to find
common ground for a mutually acceptable  farm bill proposal.  Agree-
ment  was  rather tenuously set.  The  principal  exception  was  dairy.
That  agreement,  however,  was  a  modest  victory  for Farm Bureau.
Attendant  discussions between  groups produced little or no willing-
ness  to experiment  with  income  maintenance  programs that might
be  alternatives  to  deficiency  payments  and  loan  guarantees.  As  a
consequence,  the longtime  leader  of the free  market  philosophy  in
agriculture  lost any opportunity  to firmly stand in line  with either
the academic critics or the Reagan administration.  Still, the organi-
zation could more  credibly demonstrate  some important  support for
the economic plight of many of its members.
Farm  Bureau  did  not emerge  as  a  policy  leader,  however.  Little
agreement was reached  on other provisions  of the farm bill beyond
some  basic price  support levels.  In addition,  the Farm Bureau  pro-
posal that was eventually drafted encountered difficulty in finding a
sponsor and, when it was introduced,  was largely lost in the array of
bills introduced in Congress.
The  other general  farm organizations  fared  little  better.  The  Na-
tional  Farmers  Union  (NFU)  and  National  Farmers  Organization
(NFO)  found  themselves  to  be  the  main  defenders  of the  income
maintenance  remnants  of New Deal farm policy  by mid-1984.  NFO
lobbyist  Chuck  Frazier  made  a  special  point  of attending  and  ad-
dressing  some  of the  academic  reform  conferences.  Cy  Carpenter,
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role  NFU  could play  with  the farm  crisis organizations  and  other
grassroots activists. The staff of both organizations worked, often to-
gether,  to formulate  policy responses  throughout  what was  increas-
ingly  becoming  a  period  of real  controversy.  Their  reactions  were
motivated by a fearful scenario. At the worst, the mandatory produc-
tion control views of what was emerging as an agrarian protest coali-
tion could become the sole liberal alternative.  The alternative would
in turn be  identified  as an extremist  approach,  lose and then open
the  door  to  a  dismantling  of traditional  supports.  In  the  process,
NFU and NFO would forfeit their credibility and status as the lead-
ing mouthpieces for liberal agricultural  policy.
NFU was in a particularly difficult situation because  1985 brought
considerable  pressure  from  old  liberal  allies  and  legislative  sup-
porters who were the protesters'  newfound friends.  To  avoid conflict
and still  lower potential  losses,  Farmers  Union  announced  its sup-
port  for  mandatory  supply  controls  and  spoke  on  behalf  of those
amendments and bills that contained the appropriate  provisions. At
the same time, it became an open secret to policymakers and lobby-
ists  who  opposed  controls  that  NFU  and  NFO  strongly  preferred
modifications  in existing programs  for which they also lobbied.
These two groups  were not  alone in their difficult  middle ground.
As the farm bill process  continued, the organizational  leadership  of
the  AAM  (as  opposed  to  the  factionalized  grassroots  splinters  of
AAM)  would  come  to have  similar  conflicts  between  policy  beliefs
and demands. Although the Bedell, Alexander,  Harkin and Zorinski
production cutback proposals were popularly  identified as AAM pro-
visions, there was frequent mention made that group leaders consid-
ered mandatory  controls as only the best of many bad bills.  Despite
AAM offices serving as Washington headquarters  and primary infor-
mation  source  to the fragmented  coalition  of protest  organizations,
many of its leading activists could not fully accept a bill that was the
handiwork  of Texas Agriculture  Commissioner Jim Hightower  and
four state crisis committees  rather than the national movement.
It was  this kind  of organizational  behavior that  led Congress  to
conclude that the forthcoming farm bill would be one of incremental
changes.  Its  members  could  hardly  deny  the  impact  of  the  well-
publicized  farm crisis. There  were  worthwhile  economic plans from
the  academy  but absolutely  no  information  coming  from  them  on
precisely how to translate their free market approach to the political
agenda.  Lobbyists  brought forth competing  proposals  without  effec-
tive  challenge  by  pointing  to  the self-imposed  political  isolation  of
the academics.
The Reagan administration,  using free market arguments, spoke of
its forthcoming  proposals with budget and program cuts so extensive
they  were  denounced  as  ludicrous  by  legislators  about  to face  the
1531986 elections.  The administration's  major farm group ally offered  a
bill that looked  to many  as if it were  drafted  by NFU  rather than
AFBF.  Other farm groups  that were  interested  in and  legitimately
able to offer a comprehensive  proposal were having trouble agreeing,
had little commitment  to the major changes that they put forward,
and seemed  to dislike the most vocal of the activists whom they rep-
resented. On the whole, Congress was not getting much usable infor-
mation or any consensual coalition support from private interests by
the time hearings  on the legislation began.
Commodity Groups
Specific  proposals  and  supportive  data  were  plentiful,  but  they
would not be of help in fostering the kind of reform that was so often
mentioned in  1983  and  1984. The  commodity  organizations  entered
1985 without the elaborate preparation of many of the other private
interests  but  with plenty  of forethought  as to  selective  aspects  of
farm policy needs. Most of the Washington-based  commodity lobbies
had been  watching the mixed signals  of 1984 with  considerable  at-
tention.  A great amount of internal  organizational  effort  was being
directed  by  their  staffs  toward  reaching  intragroup  agreement  on
those major farm bill provisions that would directly affect single com-
modities.
bT  some extent, these groups paid attention to the whole of agricul-
tural policy. Some, such as the National Cattlemen's Association  and
National Broiler Council,  did so more than others.  Both were  philo-
sophically  attracted to the free trade issue in the expressed  hope  of
export expansion.  On a more practical  basis, nonmarket  commodity
assistance programs  had brought dairy cattle to slaughter houses in
some competition with beef cattle and had brought higher prices for
feed  grains for chickens.  Also,  on a practical  note,  these "free  trad-
ers" expressly limited their enthusiasm to only those circumstances
in which foreign beef and chicken imports were not a problem.
However, most of the major commodity representatives  were inter-
ested primarily in price policy and only as it affected their producers.
While  organizations  such  as  the  National  Association  of  Wheat
Growers  proposed  experimenting  with  market  loans,  other  groups
felt  such  concepts  too  difficult  to  explain.  Policymakers  were  cur-
rently  in  an environment  in which  so  many  alternative  proposals
were  being introduced  that confusion  might possibly kill the entire
farm bill.  Rather  than risk that,  those  groups  whose  members  re-
ceived commodity benefits considered three factors: how to maximize
deficiency payments and keep members happy as well as financially
afloat;  how to bring commodity prices down in order to enhance ex-
ports; and how to discourage  budget  deficit-producing  and price de-
stabilizing  surpluses.  As  commodity  officials  grappled  with  these
concerns,  alternatives  to present  price  programs  became  harder to
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one another.
Since each commodity program varied  in procedures, language and
operation,  each  commodity group  used its specialized  knowledge  to
propose and negotiate modifications of its own provisions.  Other com-
modities  were  left alone  unless  it  was  possible  to propose  ways  of
diverting one  commodity's  program  benefits to another.  Some  coali-
tions were  formed,  such  as between  wheat  and corn  or  sugar  and
dairy, but the focus  of these agreements  was always on specific  com-
modity provisions.
Other  commodity  issues  were  injected  into the  farm  bill  debates
whenever  the producer groups  could  do  so.  The  National  Pork Pro-
ducers wanted  a  hog check-off as their priority  in the bill. Soon the
Cattlemen's Association wanted one for beef. The American Soybean
Association, traditionally a group opposed to farm programs, wanted
one-year  crop payments  for bean producers  in return for  lower  loan
rates-the  FAIR  program.  Sunflower  producers  gained  direct  pay-
ments in the Senate.  Despite  legislative agreements at the onset of
1985 to  avoid farm bill  mention  of market  orders,  important order
provisions were worked into the bill by those representing  milk and
fruit interests.  Several  of the bill's final trade  provisions contained
commodity  specific benefits as well.
Throughout  the  farm bill  process,  the commodity  groups  demon-
strated a considerable  ability to influence  individual provisions  and
a near total incapacity  as agents for policy change.  Loan rates were
lowered in the bill. Export assistance was enhanced.  But the greatest
contribution of the commodity lobby was in holding the line on major
provisions of a bill that none of them were in favor of several  months
earlier-income  assistance.
Industrial and Agribusiness Reformers
Early in the process, feelings ran high that the 1985 Food Security
Act would be the first farm bill to strongly reflect  the views of busi-
ness  rather than farmers.  There  was  so  much  dissatisfaction  with
present  policy.  Agricultural  experts  rarely  were  so  united  around
ideas that fit so nicely with basic business values as they were prior
to  1985.  Moreover,  agribusiness  and  industrial  leaders  frequently
spoke  of the need  to  more  effectively  influence  agricultural  policy.
There  seemed to be  new  awareness  of how  directly  business profits
could be  influenced by government  programs.
Diversion programs,  especially  since the consciousness  raising  ef-
fects  of Payment  in Kind (PIK), were  under attack from farm input
suppliers.  Sugar  and dairy programs  served  to mobilize  user coali-
tions  to  reduce  politically  inflated  prices.  Peanut  and  honey  pro-
grams were similarly targeted for elimination.  Traders and shippers
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inhibited exports.  It appeared the agribusiness community believed
that any farm policy that interfered with market conditions was bad
for business.
While  that  belief may  have  been  widely  held,  it  was  not  easily
translated  into  action.  There  were  several  reasons.  Lobbying  uses
both money  and time that might better go to other enterprises.  For
the farm  bill, with  its entrenched  producer  clientele  and  its struc-
tural features centered around commodity provisions and commodity
subdivisions in  Congress,  the costs will  always  be  especially  great.
The returns on those costs must be  problematic.  Victory  can hardly
be assured  in advance.  Even in victory there can be no specific guar-
antees as to financial  savings and profits.  Compromises, bargaining
and  negotiations  make  predictions  on  outcomes  difficult.  All  this,
along with the healthy  distrust that many business  executives  feel
toward  the  political  process,  caused  many  agribusiness  firms  and
trade associations  to proceed slowly  even  after they had been  vocal
about their interest in farm legislation. In short, agribusiness collec-
tively did not end up putting its lobbying money where its mouth had
been.
The political dynamics surrounding the farm bill impacted on the
plans of business and industry as well. There was the unwillingness
of those producer organizations  whose leaders  had earlier spoken  so
disparagingly of farm policy to promote  substantive reform.  This re-
moved much of the coalition base that was felt necessary for agribusi-
ness to affect  change.  In the event of open controversy, the farm bill
potentially  allied  farm  groups  against  business  groups.  Since
farmers  were customers,  this posed a  serious  marketing  threat the
results of which seemed more predictable and more costly than gains
from a reformed farm bill.
The  springtime  publicity  of the  farm  crisis  chilled  most  of what
remained of industry's ardor for open political  conflict. The time  ap-
peared  very  wrong.  Legislators  would  be  unresponsive.  Business
would be  portrayed  as kicking  farmers  when  they were down.  In a
sense, the first farmer suicides meant the last public words on busi-
ness profitability.
That did not mean that business was ineffective,  disinterested and
not a part of the 1985  Food Security  Act process.  Organizations  like
the International Association  of Ice Cream Manufacturers, the Food
Marketing Institute and even the small National Independent Dairy-
Food  Association kept after  dairy,  sugar and peanut programs  even
during conference  proceedings.  Such  user firms  as Pizza  Hut  and
Mars had  their representatives  active  as well.  The  Fertilizer  Insti-
tute lobbied  hard throughout the  process.  In a less obvious manner,
the Grocery Manufacturers  of America kept affirming its desire for a
free market bill.
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port of lower loan rates. They were equally instrumental, along with
several  other agribusiness  organizations,  in defeating  key  votes  on
mandatory production  controls. But, from a free market perspective,
those were the only victories that agribusiness  saw in 1985; and both
were  gained  with most  of the Washington-based  farm groups  in  at
least tacit agreement.
In retrospect,  none of this should be surprising. Several myths ac-
companied  the  belief that industry  and  business  leadership  could
reshape the 1985 Food Security Act. When but a few of these fallacies
became  evident,  the  strategies  of business-inspired  change  proved
faulty.
Among the most important were the twin myths of business unity
and  shared  self-interest.  Many  very  active  organizations  were  far
from free traders. Archer-Daniels-Midland,  for example, saw the high
levels of supports  in the sugar program  as advantageous  to its high
fructose sweeteners.  That firm and its consultants were very instru-
mental in gaining support from a few business lobbies while causing
still others to remain  silent  on the issue.  Their efforts  did much to
neutralize the impact of the sugar-users coalition and, indirectly, the
largely overlapping  opponents  of dairy programs.  Some  firms  even
argued to move further away from unrestrained trade.  For instance,
ConAgra offered a plan for export  subsidies.
Even more business unity gave way to the enthusiasm of both firms
and trade associations for single provisions of unique interest.  Grain
traders  spent  more  time  on grain  quality  than grain  pricing. Food
processors  saw  clear  producer  title  to  commodities  as the  priority
need.  The American  Bakers Association  wanted and got a wheat re-
serve.  The open-ended  structure of the farm bill gave business repre-
sentatives,  just  as  it  did  the  commodity  groups,  the  nearly
unrestrained  ability to pursue amendments of very narrow and lim-
ited interest. As a result, some potential  free traders had their lobby-
ing resources tied up elsewhere.
Instead  of finding a collectively  well-financed  and skilled lobby in
the  agribusiness  community,  coalition  leaders  encountered  more  a
myth than an actuality of power. Even the best financed staffs had to
limit  their  time  and  attention  to  selected  priorities.  In  other  in-
stances,  large  firms  and  industries  were  found to have  staffs that
were  even  more  severely  limited  by  small  size,  low  pay,  restricted
budgets  and inexperience.  Coalition meetings  were plagued by  par-
ticipant  inattention,  a  lack  of follow-through  on  assignments  and
leaks about  strategy and tactics.
The  most damaging  myth,  however,  was  the mistaken belief that
the  1985  Food Security  Act was open to everyone's  participation.  In
theory, anyone can get the ear of Congress.  In practice, they cannot.
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this was a farmer's bill  and that producer groups  held the greatest
legitimacy.  This opinion  solidified  after the farm crisis came  to the
forefront; but it was decades old. This situation held important conse-
quences.  Equally  well-prepared  information  did  not  hold  equal
weight. Access to policymakers was often a problem. It also led to the
need for agribusiness representatives to seek out even small producer
groups  to use  as coalition  partners  on  major  provisions.  They  em-
ployed  consultants  with  long-standing  agricultural  policy  ties  for
similar reasons.  Without such alliances,  agribusiness  may have had
a voice in farm bill proceedings but it would have been seldom heard.
A Brief Assessment
The events of 1985 produced  a peculiarly interesting Food Security
Act. As the legislation was being finalized in the last days of the year,
a curious reaction formed among those in the private sector who had
most actively attempted to influence its content. Protesters, longtime
farm lobbyists and business representatives  alike could be found who
praised the outcome.  This  in spite  of how much the new  act looked
like  that thoroughly  maligned  1981  Agriculture  and Food  Act,  and
despite the fact that most participants  knew that early  1986  would
see considerable modifications to the 1985 act. This reaction, in part,
was  a response  to the  end of a long and  tedious process that often
appeared  unlikely to produce  any bill at all.
In larger part, however, the participants'  reaction was to an agree-
ment that allowed  nearly every  major player-not  all of whom  have
been  mentioned  here-to win something  of consequence.  No matter
how diverse  the interest, some important provision or perception  of
philosophical  change  provided  satisfaction.  Amid the  internal  poli-
tics of Congress  and the conflict  between  executive  and legislative,
the well fought campaigns of most private interests had something to
show as the effort concluded. Select provisions of narrow interest are
the most obvious.
The major provisions,  however,  are the most logical  outcomes of a
farm  bill that  was  negotiated  in  an  exceedingly  complex  environ-
ment. It was not an environment in which a single rational perspec-
tive  or  paradigm  could  dominate  discussions.  Instead,  different
perspectives  on what were the most critical  conditions to address  in
the  bill undermined  each  other to  produce  a  rather  schizophrenic-
looking act that could be maintained only through  massive expendi-
tures.
The  lower  loan rates  are  the  feature  of the bill  most  frequently
pointed to as a departure in agricultural policy. It gave the Secretary
of Agriculture  the  opportunity  to  make  historically  deep  cuts  in
hopes  of  eventually  lowering  prices  and  enhancing  foreign  trade.
Without the conviction  of the academics and the noise made largely
158by agribusiness in operationalizing  these ideas, separating loan rates
from deficiency payments  would have been difficult.
As it was, producer  groups were able to rally their income mainte-
nance demands around the commodity provisions that have for many
years  provided political  advantages to the commodity organizations.
Even though  each  commodity  took reductions,  the final  provisions
should have  kept producer  members happy  since  these  projected  to
increasingly  higher  levels  of payments  in the  immediate  future.  It
seems  unlikely  that this could  have  come  about  without the  back
home  pressures  and  publicity  seeking  of  the  agrarian  protesters.
These  groups  effectively  moved  much  of the  focus  of farm  politics
beyond Washington, something that the traditional farm groups nei-
ther could nor  wanted to  do.  The  protesters  were  unable to accom-
plish  much  more  because  they  lacked  a  comparable  Washington
presence,  however.  Without  more  interaction  with  policy  insiders,
there was no means for developing  alternatives and effectively nego-
tiating compromises  with the same  credibility  and expertise  of the
commodity organizations.
The bill's other significant changes  also resulted from  interest in-
volvement. But these were more the product of give and take strategy
discussions over how to pass a bill than specific policy demands.  The
trade provisions were constructed  with varying degrees of input and
general support from most players.
Conservation  measures  were  agreed  upon  at  an early  stage  for
three  reasons.  Sodbuster,  swampbuster,  diversion  and  compliance
provisions  won supporters from outside the agricultural  community
and helped silence some likely critics. Second, these provisions were
portrayed  as cost-cutting mechanisms that  also dealt with the prob-
lems of surplus.  Third,  they cut  costs while  being  compatible  with
existing commodity provisions. It was difficult to find alternatives for
generating  support and reducing costs that had this advantage.
While  these  types  of  provisions  balanced  the  Food  Security  Act
nicely  to aid  in its eventual  passage,  their inclusion demonstrated
another  aspect  of interest  group  politics.  That  is, private  interests
often play  as  partners in  completing the puzzle.  They  need  not  al-
ways be  seen as parts  of the  puzzle, confusing  the process through
competing demands.
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